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Too Big to Jail: Overcoming the Roadblocks to 
Regulatory Enforcement 
 
INTRODUCTION: CONNECTING THE DOTS BETWEEN TWO 
PARALLEL WORLDS 
RENA STEINZOR∗ 
I.  THE DEREGULATORY BRIDGE ACROSS FINANCE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
I am privileged to introduce the written product of an unusual 
Symposium co-sponsored by the Maryland Law Review and the Center 
for Progressive Reform.1  As far as we know, the event is the first effort 
by the academy to make explicit the cross-cutting issues that under-
mine effective regulation and enforcement regarding the financial 
services sector and polluting industries.  We were able to assemble an 
eclectic group of leading scholars in both arenas, and especially ap-
preciate the participation of Brooksley Born, former Chairwoman of 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, who served as a mod-
ern day Cassandra during the lead-up to the financial meltdown of 
2008.  Had self-styled titans of finance like Alan Greenspan, Lawrence 
Summers, and Robert Rubin given more credence to her warnings of 
the dire collapse that lay just around the corner, the world would be a 
better place today.2  Threshold plaudits are also due to Professor Mi-
                                                        
Copyright © 2013 by Rena Steinzor. 
∗ Professor, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. 
 1.  Founded in 2002, the Center for Progressive Reform is a network of sixty scholars 
across the nation dedicated to protecting health, safety, and the environment through 
analysis and commentary.  It has a small professional staff funded by foundations.  Con-
tributing authors Thomas McGarity and Victor Flatt are members of the organization and 
I am its president.  For more information about CPR’s mission, goals, and activities, see 
http://www.progressivereform.org. 
 2.  The story of Born’s efforts was the focus of the 2009 PBS documentary “The Warn-
ing.”  Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/. 
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chael Greenberger, who served as Chairwoman Born’s senior adviser 
during those troubled times and now teaches law at the University of 
Maryland Carey School of Law, and to Anne Havemann, Maryland 
Law Review Editor in Chief, and Brendan Hogan, Executive Articles 
and Symposium Editor, without whose tireless work the Symposium 
would not have been possible. 
On the surface, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have little in 
common.  The first is the defiant poster child for regulation-run-
amok, while the second is the powerful, if often sleepy, watchdog of 
Wall Street.  Turn the telescope around, though, and the similarities 
between the root causes of the two agencies’ institutional failures are 
startling.  A powerful brew of political hostility3 and funding short-
falls4 hobble them despite the fact that the need for vigorous over-
sight in both arenas has never been more urgent.  Indeed, if we be-
lieve the findings of the world’s pre-eminent scientists and 
economists, our obstinate neglect of climate change solutions in the 
face of global economic insecurity will cost us more in the long run 
than we seem to be able to imagine.5 
So what exactly is wrong with the lead actors in the regulatory 
state assigned to supervise reckless deals and harmful pollution?  The 
SEC’s failure to anticipate, much less mitigate, the economic collapse 
of 2008 was most unfortunate, although it was just one among several 
agencies blinded by the complexity of the mechanisms used to engi-
neer the “bubble” that burst so disastrously.  The agency’s weakness in 
the aftermath of the crisis is as inexplicable as it is unforgiveable.  It 
failed to take enforcement action against Lehman Brothers, a firm at 
the epicenter of the financial meltdown; entered a sweetheart deal 
with Countrywide Financial chief executive Angelo Mozilo, who 
spearheaded the accumulation of junk mortgages that were at the 
heart of the crisis; and destroyed records of enforcement actions it 
had closed, including cases involving Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo, 
                                                        
 3.  For a discussion of “bureaucracy bashing” by hostile politicians, see RENA 
STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, 
AND THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 126–29 (2010). 
 4.  Id. at 54–72. 
 5.  Fiona Harvey, Climate Change Is Already Damaging Global Economy, Report Finds, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/sep/26/ 
climate-change-damaging-global-economy. 
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Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, Lehman Brothers, and the SAC 
Capital hedge fund.6 
Far from using the crisis to rediscover its core mission, the SEC 
has swayed under the relentless political pressure of financiers who 
have embraced the adage “the best defense is a good offense” with 
unprecedented and unrelenting determination.  In fact, as I write 
these words, the New York Times editorial page has excoriated newly 
appointed SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo White for her decision to defer 
the supervision of international derivatives trading to the weaker laws 
of the nations where the transactions occur.7  Coupled with the gov-
ernment’s massive bailout of mismanaged firms, the agency’s dismal 
record sends the signal that a second, third, or fourth crisis might cost 
the losers on Wall Street money but will make other players rich. 
Meanwhile, in the wake of the latest round of across-the-board 
budget cuts known as the “sequester,” the head of EPA’s Criminal In-
vestigation Division has acknowledged the existence of “significant 
geographic regions we can no longer cover.”8  Subject to a double 
pincer attack on its authority and resources, EPA’s every move is con-
trolled by skittish political operatives within the White House, who 
repeatedly delay and weaken regulations the agency’s authorizing 
statutes command it to write.9  As I write these words, Senate Republi-
cans are doing their best to block confirmation of Gina McCarthy, a 
long-time career bureaucrat who has worked for elected officials from 
both parties and is President Obama’s nominee for EPA Administra-
tor.10 
                                                        
 6.  Katherine Reynolds Lewis, Mary Schapiro’s SEC: Its 6 Biggest Blunders—So Far, FIN. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/ 
2011/09/12/Mary-Schapiros-SEC-Its-6-Biggest-Blunders-So-Far.aspx#page2.  
 7.  Editorial, A Disappointing Debut, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2013, at A26, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/opinion/a-disappointing-debut-at-the-sec.html? 
partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=0. 
 8.  John McArdle, EPA: “There are Significant Geographic Regions We Can No Longer Cov-
er”—Agency’s Top Cop,  CLIMATEWIRE, May 6, 2013, http://www.eenews.net/public/ 
Greenwire/2013/05/06/1?page_type=print. 
 9.  See, e.g., RENA STEINZOR, JAMES GOODWIN & MICHAEL PATOKA, CTR. FOR 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AT THE WHITE HOUSE: HOW POLITICS 
TRUMPS PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, WORKER SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2011), 
available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/OIRA_Meetings_1111.pdf. 
 10.  See John M. Broder, Senate Panel Advances Nominee for E.P.A. N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/us/politics/senate-panel-advances-nominee-
for-epa.html?_r=0 (describing Republican opposition); Sherwood Boehlert, Op-Ed, GOP 
Must End Gina McCarthy Obstruction, POLITICO, May 16, 2013, http://www.politico.com/ 
story/2013/05/epa-gop-gina-mccarthy-obstruction-91461.html (describing McCarthy’s 
record of reaching across the aisle). 
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Because the content of their missions is so different, the root 
causes of the agencies’ dysfunction may appear to have little in com-
mon.  The SEC’s struggle to master the convoluted assessment of fi-
nancial risks posed by new investment vehicles and EPA’s faltering ef-
forts to reduce toxic emissions differ fundamentally in execution and 
result.  Big money is made in SEC’s bailiwick.  Big money can only be 
lost if regulated industries fail to thwart EPA’s momentum.  The SEC 
is viewed as a necessary evil—few would advocate a totally free mar-
ketplace—while EPA’s opponents seem determined to stop it in its 
tracks.  Few venture onto the unstable bridge that links the two and is 
just beginning to emerge as a central project of trade associations 
founded to keep government off their members’ backs. 
Powerful institutions like the Chamber of Commerce recognized 
the potential for cross-fertilization of people and ideas between the 
two arenas some time ago, well before their counterparts in the public 
interest community glimpsed those connections.11  The fading core of 
the nation’s industrial base—the heavy-duty manufacturing sector—
has long experience with the potent strategy of exploiting economic 
downturns to convince the public that jobs and a clean environment 
cannot co-exist.  Having constructed an updated version of the de-
regulatory bandwagon with the help of the traditional conservative 
coalition that now dominates the Republican Party, foresighted man-
ufacturers were only too happy to welcome investment bankers on 
board.  Weakening the statutory requirements commonly known as 
“Dodd-Frank” has become as important a priority for the Chambers’ 
deregulatory staff as undermining EPA’s “job killing” initiatives.12 
                                                        
 11.  See, e.g., Thomas J. Donohue, Regulations Devastate Economic Growth, U.S. CHAMBER 
OF COM. (Oct. 14, 2010), http:// www.uschamber.com/press/opeds/regulations-devastate 
-economic-growth (condemning the “regulatory hurricane” that threatens the U.S. econ-
omy); JAMES GATTUSO ET AL., HERITAGE FOUND., RED TAPE RISING: OBAMA’S TORRENT OF 
NEW REGULATION (2010), http:// www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/10/red-tape-
rising-obamas-torrent-of-new-regulation (contending that burden of regulation has grown 
at alarming rate); STEPHEN F. HAYWARD, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., THE EPA’S 
POWER GRAB (2009), http:// www.aei.org/article/101456 (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library) (condemning EPA’s proposals to regulate greenhouse gas emissions). 
 12.  Compare CTR. FOR CAPITAL MARKETS’ COMPETITIVENESS, FAR AGENDA 2013 (2013), 
http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/CCMC_FAR_ 
Agenda-2013.pdf (proposing regulatory and statutory fixes to Dodd-Frank), with U.S. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, IMPACTS OF REGULATIONS ON EMPLOYMENT, EXAMINING EPA’S 
OFT-REPEATED CLAIMS THAT REGULATIONS CREATE JOBS (2013), http://www.uschamber. 
com/sites/default/files/reports/020360_ETRA_Briefing_NERA_Study_final.pdf (review-
ing EPA’s methodology for measuring the impact of a regulation and concluding that the 
agency’s methods are “flawed” and replete with “striking omissions and inconsistencies”). 
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II.  DEREGULATION AS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE GLOBAL 
RECESSION 
Our Symposium begins with Brooksley Born’s analysis of how the 
2008 meltdown came about and the reasons why the revival of strin-
gent regulation and enforcement are necessary to prevent another 
crash.  Born bases her analysis on her first-hand observations as a high 
profile attorney for financial industry clients,13 her service as Chair-
woman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the late 
1990s, and, especially, her participation as one of ten Commissioners 
appointed by the President and congressional leadership to serve on 
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”).14 
She explains how Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Re-
serve for two decades, as well as a “laissez-faire economist” and “Ayn 
Rand disciple,”15 fostered the belief that financial markets could self-
regulate.  Eventually, this mantra was embraced by the entire financial 
sector, which spent the astounding sum of $2.7 billion on federal lob-
bying efforts at the same time that financial services employees made 
more than $1 billion in federal election campaign contributions.  This 
flood of cash produced deregulatory “gaps” that nurtured what Born 
describes as a “lightly regulated shadow banking system.”16  In just a 
few short years, this alternative system was trading so-called “over-the-
counter derivatives” at a level that rivaled “the traditional banking sys-
tem in size and importance.”17 
                                                        
 13.  Brooksley E. Born, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, http://www.arnoldporter.com/ 
professionals.cfm?action=view&id=557. 
 14.  The FCIC was created by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, which 
was signed into law by President Obama on May 20, 2009.  Pub. L. No. 111-21 (2009).  
Born was appointed by then House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA).  Press Release, Demo-
crats, Reid, Pelosi Announce Appointments to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
(July 15, 2009), available at http://democrats.senate.gov/2009/07/15/reid-pelosi-
announce-appointments-to-the-financial-crisis-inquiry-commission/ (last visited May 21, 
2013).  The FCIC’s final report was issued on January 27, 2011; the Commission split six to 
four along partisan lines in voting its approval of the report.  Get the Report, U.S. FIN. CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMM’N, http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report (last visited May 21, 2013).  
Astoundingly, the report became a bestseller on lists maintained by both The New York 
Times and The Washington Post. Best Sellers: Paperback Nonfiction, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2011); 
Christopher Schoppa, Best Sellers, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2011.  Jeff Madrick, writing in The 
New York Review of Books, hailed it as “the most comprehensive indictment of the American 
financial failure that has yet been made.”  Jeff Madick, The Wall Street Leviathan, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Apr. 28, 2011, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/apr/28/wall-
street-leviathan/. 
 15.  Brooksley Born, Keynote Address, 72 MD. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2013). 
 16.  Id. at 1165. 
 17.  Id. 
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Born and the FCIC majority lament the grave reluctance of over-
sight agencies to “police” grossly problematic practices.18  Her first 
and most important example is the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”), 
which had the authority to police mortgage terms and was “well aware 
of widespread abuses in mortgage lending practices,” but did noth-
ing.19  In this vacuum, fraudulent mortgage lenders pushed unquali-
fied borrowers to sign balloon loans that they could never repay, and 
then resold the loans to investors known as “mortgage securitizers.”20  
The bad paper was then sold and resold, divided into tranches, re-
characterized and hedged, until its core weakness—mortgagee insol-
vency—became invisible.21  Born points out that current Federal Re-
serve Chairman Ben Bernanke admitted to the FCIC that the FRB’s 
neglect of the mortgage market during the housing boom was a “se-
vere failure.”22 
Born similarly condemns the SEC for failing to ensure that mort-
gage securitizers gave adequate disclosures to the investors that 
bought their junk paper.23  Instead, she says that the agency relied on 
“shelf registration” provisions and exemptions from registration that 
allowed multiple public offerings without adequate investor disclo-
sure.24  She explains that the FCIC attributed the extraordinarily rapid 
growth of the OTC derivatives market to its deregulation by the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000.  By June 2008, the 
“explosive growth” of the OTC derivatives market had reached an 
astounding $650 trillion, “more than ten times the gross domestic 
product of all the countries in the world.”25  This deregulation and its 
utterly foreseeable consequences were “key turning point[s] in the 
march toward the financial crisis.”26 
The SEC also committed grave errors with respect to the coun-
try’s largest investment banks, which grew with “little or no supervi-
sion except for their securities operations.”27  The five largest banks 
were so bloated with bad debt that they ultimately “disappeared” dur-
ing the financial crisis, either going bankrupt (Lehman Brothers), be-
                                                        
 18.  Id. at 1164. 
 19.  Id. at 1165–66. 
 20.  Id. at 1165. 
 21.  For a full description of this dynamic, see MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE 
THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010). 
 22.  Born, supra note 15, at 1166. 
 23.  Id. at 1165. 
 24.  Id. at 1167. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 1168. 
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ing acquired under emergency circumstances (that is, a buyers’ mar-
ket) by large bank holding companies (Bear Stearns and Merrill 
Lynch), or converting themselves to bank holding companies and 
submitting to the supervision of the FRB (Goldman Sachs and Mor-
gan Stanley).28 
As tempting as it is to believe that these incidents of catastrophic 
regulatory neglect will be prevented by the new authorities regulators 
received when their authorizing statutes were reformed by the passage 
of Dodd-Frank, Born is not especially sanguine about such progress.  
In addition to the cash that still floods the political system, inspiring 
multiple efforts to repeal portions of Dodd-Frank, Born worries that 
Congress will find oblique methods, such as cutting agency budgets, 
to undermine the work of federal regulators.29  With so much money 
at stake, such cuts seem as far removed from legitimate deficit con-
cerns as they are closely related to deregulatory ambitions.  And, of 
course, funding cuts will only make it more difficult for federal regu-
lators to overcome their deeply entrenched “muscle memory” of 
keeping a low profile rather than mounting tough and ambitious en-
forcement of new and old rules. 
III.  THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RE-REGULATING THE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR 
Our next author, Wallace Turbeville,30 explains the implications 
of cost-benefit analysis for future financial services regulation.  This 
methodology is among the most powerful elements of the cross-
cutting deregulatory campaign mounted by business groups—cross-
cutting because the playbook for its application was developed in the 
context of health, safety, and environmental regulation, especially 
with respect to EPA’s activities.31 
In a report entitled The Importance of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Finan-
cial Regulation, Paul Rose and Christopher Walker, professors at the 
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law and fellows of the Cham-
                                                        
 28.  Id. at 1169. 
 29.  Id. at 1170–72. 
 30.  Turbeville is a lawyer and financial services expert who has worked in the financial 
services industry since 1978.  He practiced law for seven years and then joined Goldman 
Sachs as an investment banker specializing in infrastructure finance and public/private 
partnerships.  He is now a Senior Fellow at Demos, a nonprofit advocating reform in the 
financial services industry.  For more information about its programs and views, see 
http://www.demos.org/about-demos. 
 31.  See, e.g., NAT’L CTR FOR ENVTL. ECON., EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING 
ECONOMIC ANALYSES (2010), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/ 
vwAN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-0568-50.pdf. 
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ber of Commerce Center for Capital Markets’ Competitiveness, refer 
with enthusiasm to the leadership of Harvard Law School Professor 
Cass Sunstein, an early architect of cost-benefit analysis in the envi-
ronmental field.32  Eager to translate theory into practice, Sunstein 
headed the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) during President Barack 
Obama’s first term.33  He is now back teaching at Harvard. 
Sunstein’s strong commitment to cost-benefit analysis is best ex-
pressed in his 2005 book, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Princi-
ple, where he writes that environmental laws are the product of power-
ful and irrational social forces caused by the average citizen’s overre-
overreaction to risk.34  Because non-experts succumb to irrational 
panic in response to improbable risk, “the public’s demand for gov-
ernment intervention can be greatly affected by probability neglect, 
so that regulators may end up engaging in extensive regulation pre-
cisely because intense emotional reactions are making people relative-
ly insensitive to the (low) probability that dangers will ever come to 
fruition.”35  Sunstein sees these reactions as so extreme that he rec-
ommends preventing the public from influencing government deci-
sions that involve such risks: “[T]here is [a risk that] high levels of 
public participation in technical domains [will] simply heighten pub-
lic fear, with unfortunate consequences for policy.”36  His tool for 
achieving this troubling goal is cost-benefit analysis. 
Sunstein, of course, did not bring cost-benefit analysis to the fore 
of White House regulatory review.  Rather, its genesis was in response 
to the landmark legislation passed in the wake of Watergate and the 
Vietnam War, a period that saw the creation of EPA, the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion.37  Gradually, over four decades, the application of this flawed 
                                                        
 32.  PAUL ROSE & CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, CTR. FOR CAPITAL MARKETS’ 
COMPETITIVENESS, THE IMPORTANCE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 
(2013). 
 33.  For a description of his tenure there, see Dan Froomkin, Cass Sunstein: The Obama 
Administration’s Ambivalent Regulator, HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2011, 10:51 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/13/cass-sunstein-obama-ambivalent-regulator-
czar_n_874530.html. 
 34.  CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005). 
 35.  Id. at 69. 
 36.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1161 (2002) (reviewing 
PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)). 
 37.  For a history of regulatory review, see Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Central-
ized White House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209 (2012). 
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methodology has become increasingly elaborate and formal.38  De-
spite its entrenchment as a hurdle to surmount before a proposed or 
final rule is published in the Federal Register, the methodology has 
come under heavy fire as a tool for killing protective regulation.39 
Critics of cost-benefit analysis in the health and safety arena de-
plore its tendency to overstate costs and understate benefits.  They ar-
gue that all the number crunching produces estimates that appear 
precise but are in truth the product of inaccurate, opaque, and even 
morally objectionable assumptions.  They argue that cost-benefit anal-
ysis pushes the regulatory system in only one direction: toward weak-
ening protections in order to lower industry compliance costs. 
In an effort to justify the migration of such analyses to the finan-
cial services arena, the Rose and Walker report explains that financial 
regulatory agencies are independent, and therefore labor under the 
misimpression that they are immune from the methodology that ap-
plies to Executive Branch agencies.  They urge sweeping reform: 
For more than three decades—under both Democratic and 
Republican administrations—cost-benefit analysis has been a 
fundamental tool of effective regulation. . . .  Through the 
use of cost-benefit analysis in financial services regulation, 
regulators can determine if their proposals will actually work 
to solve the problem they are seeking to address. . . .  The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) only elevates the importance of 
cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation.  By requiring 
nearly 400 rulemakings spread across more than 20 regula-
tory agencies, implementing Dodd-Frank is an unprecedent-
ed challenge for both regulators and regulated entities. . . .  
Although financial market regulators have not entirely 
avoided the influence of cost benefit analysis, for largely his-
torical reasons they have adopted the method both more 
slowly and more haphazardly than many other agencies.40 
Turbeville’s article strides right to the fundamental article of 
faith for those advocating the stringent application of cost-benefit 
analysis to financial rules to prevent re-regulation—the “Efficient 
Market Hypothesis.”41  Espoused by Alan Greenspan, among others, 
                                                        
 38.  Id. at 238–68. 
 39.  See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); Richard W. Parker, Grading the 
Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345 (2003). 
 40.  ROSE & WALKER, supra note 32, at v, 5–6. 
 41.  Wallace Turbeville, A New Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Financial Regulation: 
Inefficiency of Capital Intermediation in a Deregulated System, 72 MD. L. REV. 1173, 1183 (2013). 
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this theory posits that if the market for financial services is allowed to 
operate unimpeded, efficiency—and cost-savings for customers—are 
optimized.  A similar theory—that the only justification for regulation 
is when the “free” market “fails” has also been advanced by far-right 
conservatives in the environmental arena.42 
Turbeville argues that if the flawed notion that unregulated fi-
nancial markets are the epitome of efficiency is incorporated into the 
system for evaluating new rules, cost-benefit analyses will result in one-
dimensional comparisons between the costs incurred by regulated in-
dustries and the far more attenuated benefits of preventing outright 
fraud.43  Instead, he says that the correct yardstick for measuring the 
benefits of such rules is the extent to which they prevent excessive 
draining of capital from the economy to pay bankers for facilitating 
deals.  Known as “intermediation,” which Turbeville describes as “the 
plumbing that connects capital sources to capital uses,” these sums 
can be quite large and—more to the point—larger than they need to 
be.44 
In agreement with the market analysis offered by Born, Turbe-
ville observes that the abandonment of the Glass-Steagall Act gave rise 
to a small number of very large “multifunctional ‘universal’ banks” 
that wield tremendous market power, allowing them to withdraw ex-
cessive value from the intermediation process.45  He notes that the fi-
nancial sector’s share of aggregate Gross Domestic Product has been 
in the range of 8.3% in recent years, an increase from historic levels 
of 4.1%.46  The difference between the two figures is the result of un-
warranted and excessive profits that impose great costs—or, in cost-
benefit analysis language—forestall great benefits from the society as 
a whole. 
Turbeville’s analysis suggests that to remain useful to policymak-
ers, cost-benefit analysis of financial service sector rules must consider 
a significantly broader definition of regulatory beneficiaries than the 
banking industry would recognize.  Or, in other words, such analyses 
must find a way of measuring not just the increased compliance costs 
imposed on the financial sector, but the liberated intermediation 
costs—or benefits to the productive capacity of the society as a 
whole—that would result from a regulatory proposal. 
                                                        
 42.  See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTALISM (2001). 
 43.  Turbeville, supra note 41, at 1177. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 1178. 
 46.  Id. at 1179. 
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It is easy to anticipate the central technocratic objections of 
bankers to this proposal—namely, the difficulty of quantifying the dif-
ference between justifiable and unjustified intermediation costs.  But 
Turbeville reports that a variety of economists have developed models 
designed to measure such costs over sufficiently lengthy periods that 
factors influencing their steady escalation can be teased out, meas-
ured, and (hopefully) eliminated.47  For example, Professor Thomas 
Philippon has adapted a neoclassical growth model to measure such 
costs in the United States over an 140-year period, producing a Finan-
cial Intermediation Cost Index that estimates the unit price of such 
services over time.48  It shows that the index has been trending up-
ward, especially since the 1970s, a result Philippon finds anomalous 
given the efficiencies that should have occurred as a result of advanc-
es in information technology.  Philippon concludes that increases are 
primarily due to excessive trading.  Turbeville argues that the two best 
proofs of Philippon’s theory are the manic derivatives trading and 
hedging that preceded the 2008 crisis and so-called “high-frequency 
trading,” which is triggered automatically based on algorithms built 
into the computer systems used by large investment houses.49  The lat-
ter practice caused the “flash crash” on May 6, 2010, during which the 
Dow Jones Average plunged 1000 points in a matter of minutes.50 
IV.  RESTORING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 
Turning to an examination of how deregulatory pressures have 
undercut environmental protection, we have three authors who to-
gether account for decades of experience in academia and in prac-
tice: Thomas McGarity, the Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long Endowed 
Chair in Administrative Law at the University of Texas;51 David 
Uhlmann, Jeffrey F. Liss Professor from Practice at the University of 
Michigan;52 and Victor Flatt, Tom and Elizabeth Taft Distinguished 
                                                        
 47.  Id. at 1186–94. 
 48.  Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient?  On the Theory 
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gram at the school.  He joined the Michigan faculty following a seventeen-year stint at the 
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Professor of Environmental Law at the University of North Carolina 
Chapel Hill.53  Professors McGarity and Uhlmann explore the pro-
tracted difficulties regulators encounter in civil and criminal en-
forcement, while Professor Flatt closes the Symposium with thoughts 
about how the abstract interests at stake in such cases can lead to pub-
lic apathy, to the detriment of the political will needed to sustain 
them. 
Professor McGarity’s topic is the lengthy, star-crossed effort to 
bring U.S. power plants into compliance with the Clean Air Act’s “new 
source” standards.  Undermined by a series of political reversals at the 
top of the EPA leadership, enforcement actions begun during the 
second term of the Clinton administration were suppressed during 
the two-term presidency of George W. Bush.54  But the resilience of 
EPA’s career staff maintained their vitality and, demonstrating the 
power of single-minded prosecutorial commitment, brought them to 
fruition close to two decades after they began. 
To understand why an enforcement sweep against power plants 
for upgrading their equipment would trigger such massive and sus-
tained resistance, it is helpful to know at the threshold that coal-fired 
plants were “grandfathered” into the Clean Air Act, meaning that they 
did not have to retrofit to clean up their emissions.55  Such plants also 
operated far longer than anyone expected; some are now in their 
sixth decade of use, roughly twice as long as the predictions of their 
useful lives were when Congress originally considered their status un-
der the Act.56  Siting a new plant is quite difficult, leaving utilities in a 
situation where constant repairs and upgrades were essential. 
The EPA’s efforts to define when pollution control retrofits were 
required by changes that in effect rendered an existing unit a “new 
source” for regulatory purposes were embattled from the start be-
cause the installation of new technology could cost millions.57  With 
respect to power plants, Professor McGarity reports, this process be-
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 54.  Thomas O. McGarity, When Strong Enforcement Works Better than Weak Regulation: The 
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 55.  NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., BREATH OF FRESH AIR 11–12 (2003). 
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came “far and away the most controversial standard” in the Clean Air 
Act because electric utilities play a crucial role in maintaining the 
high American standard of living while simultaneously relying on coal 
as their chief fuel, despite the fact that coal heavily pollutes the air.58  
If EPA allowed utility owners and operators to patch and fix their 
plants without interfering, so that essentially new units were never re-
quired to install state of the art pollution control devices, health-based 
standards for clean air would become unachievable. 
Professor McGarity traces the evolution of an exceptionally com-
plicated set of regulatory guidance documents governing the deter-
mination that so-called “routine maintenance” had crossed the line 
into the territory of constructing a new source.59  With federal regula-
tors hot on the trail of such violations, some utilities were able to 
strike “sweetheart settlement deals” with state environmental agencies 
before the Department of Justice could file a complaint.60  Neverthe-
less, EPA enforcement staff worked overtime to hustle as many cases 
as possible to court before the advent of the second Bush presidency.  
Their anxiety was justified on the last day of 2002 when a separate 
part of EPA, acting at the request of the White House, issued a “Safe 
Harbor” proposal that substantially undermined some of the pending 
enforcement cases.61  For the remaining years of the Bush administra-
tion, enforcement staff struggled to develop and file cases even as the 
regulatory staff wrote new guidance to undermine those efforts.62  
Federal efforts were bolstered by aggressive state enforcement and 
private citizen suits.  With the election of Barack Obama, enforce-
ment lost its ambivalence, and in 2009, EPA and the Justice Depart-
ment announced a new “national initiative, targeting electric utilities 
whose coal-fired power plants violate the law.” Many of those cases are 
ongoing. 
The cases ended up delivering huge benefits to public health and 
the environment.  The EPA ultimately took enforcement actions 
against about forty-five percent, or 467, of the coal-fired electricity 
generating “units” in service.63  (A power plant can have more than 
one generating unit and the largest have several.)  The companies 
agreed to spend $12.8 billion on pollution controls and pay about $80 
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million in fines.64  The EPA estimates that when the settlements are 
fully implemented, they will reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by more 
than 1.8 million tons and nitrogen oxide emissions by 596,000 tons, 
both on an annual basis, saving thousands of lives and avoiding tens 
of thousands of cases of respiratory disease.65 
Beyond these impressive benefits, the power plant new source 
enforcement project should teach us the lesson that any time a regu-
latory agency is plagued by controversy—as EPA has been through 
most of its history and as SEC and other financial sector regulatory 
bodies are rapidly becoming—regulated industries respond with en-
trenched resistance to standard enforcement not just in court, but be-
fore Congress and at the White House.  In an article tracking the ex-
pensive battle over bank card debit fees published in 2012, Professor 
McGarity calls this kind of epic battle “administrative law as ‘blood 
sport.’”66  The story he tells about the new-source enforcement project 
might be called “blood sport enforcement.” 
Despite the tortuous process imposed on EPA enforcement by 
bitter industry resistance and blatant political interference, Professor 
McGarity identifies the benefits of such cases that extend far beyond 
the relief won by the government with respect to any particular power 
plant.67  Chief among them is the “general deterrence” achieved with-
in the industry as a whole as companies that are not involved in specif-
ic prosecutions take preventive measures to remain out of trouble.68  
And, of course, once they have taken expensive steps to improve their 
compliance, enforcement must continue to maintain a level playing 
field competitively. 
Professor McGarity explains that a major advantage for regula-
tors who choose enforcement over rulemaking is the absence of 
White House interference in such cases.69  In fact, he reveals, internal 
White House rules actually prohibit political staffers from contacting 
agencies about pending enforcement actions unless they receive pre-
clearance from the White House counsel’s office.70  Given the growing 
challenges of blood sport policymaking, this advantage can only in-
crease in importance. 
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Professor David Uhlmann shifts readers to the parallel world of 
criminal enforcement, broadening the scope from EPA to encompass 
health and safety violations that cause extreme catastrophes, such as 
the massive explosion that killed thirty miners at Massey Energy’s Up-
per Big Branch mine in Montcoal, West Virginia on April 9, 2010.71  A 
series of egregious regulatory violations that the company and the 
Mine Safety and Health Administration had left to fester caused the 
tragedy.72  The situation was sufficiently disturbing that federal prose-
cutors began the arduous task of prosecuting the head of security at 
the mine, who destroyed evidence and made false statements to inves-
tigators, as well as the mine superintendent for his role in perpetuat-
ing rampant and dangerous safety violations.73 
However, Professor Uhlmann explains, the most effective way to 
deter corporate crime is to prosecute the individuals responsible for 
the conduct that violated the law and the corporation where they 
worked.74  With clearly established and powerful criminal penalties 
available to punish companies that fail to ensure compliance, Profes-
sor Uhlmann finds no excuse to ignore such prosecutions.  For rea-
sons he finds difficult to fathom, the corporation responsible for the 
Upper Big Branch disaster—Massey Energy (“Massey”)—escaped 
prosecution, apparently through the simple ploy of selling itself to a 
second company, Alpha Natural Resources (“Alpha”).75  That compa-
ny, which had successor liability for all of Massey’s misdeeds, ultimate-
ly signed an agreement to pay civil penalties and take remedial action; 
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) deceptively described the agree-
ment as “the largest-ever resolution in a criminal investigation of a 
mine disaster.”76 
This type of resolution, known as a “deferred” or “non-
prosecution” agreement, is increasingly common.  Professor 
Uhlmann reports that before 2002, DOJ rarely made such deals, com-
pleting only eleven over the previous decade, or roughly one annual-
ly.77  But during the presidency of George W. Bush and continuing in-
to the Obama administration, the choice of this weak enforcement 
tool accelerated, with 129 such deals reached during the Bush years 
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and 125 more during President Obama’s first term.78  Professor 
Uhlmann traces the popularity of this unsatisfactory alternative to 
DOJ’s angst over the prosecution of Arthur Andersen, Enron’s ac-
counting firm.79  When the Supreme Court of the United States over-
turned the company’s conviction in 2005 based on faulty jury instruc-
tions, critics attacked the prosecutors for administering a “corporate 
death penalty” that put the firm out of business for no good reason, 
wiping out 28,000 jobs.80 
The problem with this reaction, Professor Uhlmann writes, is that 
it effectively eliminates the deterrence to corporate criminality that 
could be achieved by routine criminal charges.81  He finds unconvinc-
ing the dual justifications offered for the deferred and non-
prosecution alternative: first, that such deals resolve cases more quick-
ly and efficiently, allowing companies to commit their scarce re-
sources to remediating the results of their misconduct, and, second, 
that they avoid the “collateral damage” imposed on such a grand scale 
by the Andersen fiasco.82  Rather, he argues, these agreements repre-
sent a lazy way out for the DOJ, allowing prosecutors to obtain the 
same monetary penalties, factual admissions, corporate cooperation, 
and structural reforms without doing the heavy lifting required to 
prepare a criminal case for court.83 
By far the most enthusiastic adoption of deferred or non-
prosecution agreements has occurred in the mainstream Criminal Di-
vision of the DOJ, as opposed to its specialized Environment and Nat-
ural Resources and Antitrust Divisions.84  The two specialized divisions 
have distinguished themselves with considerably more aggressive 
prosecutions of corporate crimes than the Criminal Division.  Statis-
tics compiled by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), in-
dicate that between 2004 and 2009, the Criminal Division brought 
thirty-eight criminal prosecutions against corporations, but entered 
forty-four deferred and non-prosecution agreements.85  According to 
analyses performed by University of Virginia Professor Brandon Gar-
rett, large, publicly held, domestic corporations benefit from deferred 
and non-prosecution more often than small or foreign corporations.86  
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The types of cases most often covered by such agreements are fraud 
and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations.87 
Professor Uhlmann’s bottom line is hard to dispute.  As the fed-
eral government shrinks in size, driven by deficit reduction and lower 
tax revenues, the deterrence provided by aggressive, high-profile en-
forcement has never been more important.  Allowing a company with 
as shameful a track record as Massey to escape unscathed sends the 
message that is amazingly backed up by these statistics: the bigger a 
company and the more egregious its behavior, the better chance it 
has of avoiding punishment. 
Professor Victor Flatt closes our Symposium with reflections on 
why contemporary environmental problems may seem abstract to 
members of the public.88  He compares the attention environmental 
issues garnered in the 1970s to the changing attitudes that developed 
in the 1980s and remain today.  At least when it comes to the envi-
ronment, he argues, harms have come to seem less immediate and 
threatening, and therefore are seen as less of a threat to the social or-
der.  In such circumstances, the public zeal, which is manifested in 
part through calls for better enforcement of laws, has waned. 
He focuses throughout on climate change, arguing that contem-
porary affluence may have masked its threat.  Among other hypothe-
ses, he suggests that the world’s people may be dividing into self-
perceived “winners” and “losers” with respect to climate, with more 
affluent nations such as our own able to avoid its most devastating ef-
fects.89  Professor Flatt is certainly right that progress on climate 
change has stalled, and he is not the first to suspect that these threats 
seem attenuated to developed countries, including and especially our 
own.  Yet it is hard to imagine that the failures in enforcement and 
regulation identified by his co-authors can be connected to such apa-
thy, even if it is a real factor in fluctuating perceptions of the risks of 
climate change. 
V.  CONTINUING THE CROSS-WALK 
We hope that the cross-walk we have begun between the increas-
ingly related worlds of financial and health and safety enforcement 
will continue, in the academy and in the real world.  With both areas 
flagging for many of the same reasons, to the strong disadvantage of 
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the public interest, we hope that increasing such self-conscious paral-
lelism will at the very least help advocates of more aggressive prosecu-
tion overcome the barriers erected by the special interests that profit 
from breaking the law.  The alternative is the dangerous sense that 
some entities have, indeed, become too big for government to jail, 
with their competitors and customers at their mercy to a degree that 
is frightening to contemplate. 
